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TARNISHED ARMOR
EROSION OF MILITARY ETHICS

BY

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addressed are three U.S. Army War College ethical investigations
with a view towards determining degree of correlation; functional
areas of major concern; and senior leader ethical profiles.
Recommendations focus on outcomes addressable within existing
Army systems and regulations.

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TARNISHED ARMOR
EROSION OF MILITARY ETHICS

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

'President Scoffs At Congress.' 'Invisible Government Trades Arms For Hostages.' 'Contras Receive Illegal Aid.' 'I Never Knew! Says President.' Banner headlines like these monopolized the national press in the latter half of 1987. Like hounds with the fox's scent, the media chased a masterfully elusive president. The presidents' prospects for escape, however, diminished with each testimonial before the joint Congressional committee. As successive witnesses took the stand, revealing their roles in the affair, "A Sad And Sordid Story"[1] was slowly unraveled. As the strings of illegal funds, secret Swiss bank accounts, laundered money, drug trafficing, private air forces, bag men, and kickbacks fell from the indistinguishable core, a unique pattern began to permeate the complex mosaic.

THE PATTERN

The pattern was initially random in occurrence, discontinuous, and discernible to only the most perceptive investigators. As the hearings progressed, however, the pattern took on a regularity and nodes of activity began to emerge. Each node was associated with a personage who ultimately became a major player in the dark intrigue. Soon there was connectivity, and like links in a chain, irrefutable bonding.

THE BETRAYAL

Each link in the Iran-Contra chain had a name. Most memorable were Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North; Admiral Poindexter, Brigadier General (USAR) Edwin Meese; and Colonel Robert Dutton. Each of these senior officers is experienced and mature to a degree that raises questions as to why they would leave themselves open to questions of conduct. Additionally, Colonel (Ret) McFarlane; Brigadier General Singlaub; and Major General Richard Secord placed themselves into similar questionable position. These men are as diversified in personality, viewpoint, and ability as one would expect from any random sample drawn from a normal population of executives. Yet, in three regards, each is identical. They are all

senior military officers; all have raised serious question as to whether or not they have compromised their integrity during Iran-Contra operations and testimony; and each appears, in some regard, to have violated the strict ethical guidelines under which military officers operate.

THE ETHIC

The Military Ethic separates the professional fighting man from his civilian counterpart. It is armor worn into battle by soldiers defending the National Will. It's a glittering moral shield comprised of the splendor of the Bill of Rights; beauty of the Constitution; purity of national values; and God. The Ethic gives the American soldier moral ascendancy over enemies and fuels the fires of hope and purpose during the most desperate time. It is an elixir for fear and protective shield against antagonists blows. Its brilliance is reflective of righteousness in whose name it is invoked. **The military ethic is the professional soldiers most cherished companion.**

In its splendor, the Army ethic has served generations of American fighting men, but not without cost. Should you look closely you might discern a chink here, a dent there, perhaps just a hint of discoloration elsewhere. This suit of armor does not

stand as tall as it once did. The gauntlet grips the hilt of democracy's' sword somewhat less authoritatively. The indiscernible visage is less frightening; its presence less intimidating. The Iran - Contra issue of 1987 went far in damaging credibility of military institutions. Yet, was it really a catalyst for the tarnish on the Nations' armor or have we failed to heed the signs of degradation?. There have been many.

WARNING SIGNS

Foremost among factors detrimental to the image and prestige of the military institutions is the Viet Nam war. The war was not popular with American citizenry and became the focal point of politics in the late 1960's and early 1970's. The unjust war; My Lai massacre; and the draft weighed heavily in the equation which summed to societal disapproval of the military. The problem was exacerbated by the advent of an allegedly inferior all volunteer defense force, Watergate, and cheating scandals at both Army and Air Force military academies.[2,3,4,5] The fires of military disapproval were fueled by recruiting improprieties in the early 1980's; US Marine Corps espionage incidents in foreign embassies; and resignation of many retired military officers, serving as political appointees, for moral and ethical improprieties. These

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events **served** to **refocus** national attention on ethics in the military.

THE QUEST

Irangate reoriented national attention on the military and found it wanting. The tarnish on the moral-ethical service armor has come to the forefront. Reestablishing its previous splendor is now our most important mission. To this end, further analysis of its origin is necessary. It commences with an understanding of the national psyche.

ENDNOTES

1. Austen Ian. "A 'sad and sordid' story." McLeans, 18 May 1987, p. 18.

2. Department Of The Army; Deputy Chief Of Staff For Personnel; Final Report Of The West Point Study Group; 27 July 1987.

3. Priest, Robert F. United States Military Academy; West Point, New York; "Four - Year Changes In Cadet Values, Class Of 1979." (Report 79-015), Office Of The Director Of Institutional Research, October 1979.

4. Priest, Robert F. "Changes In The Moral Values Of The Class Of 1979." (Report 79-05), West Point, New York: United States Military Academy, Office Of The Director Of Institutional Research, March 1979.

5. V'Ren, Richard C. "A Psychiatrist Looks At West Point, Ivory Fortress" Bobbs - Merrik Company, Inc. Indianapolis, New York; 1974.

CHAPTER II

DERIVATION OF THE ARMY ETHIC

Understanding the national psyche is fundamental to derivation of the emphasis ascribed to, and value assigned, each component of the National Will, from which the Army Ethic is derived. The psyche is comprised of societal values, norms, morays, and folkways which formalize - make discrete and measurable - components of the national will. The national will determines the nations' direction and future destination. The ability to quantify its components permits hierarchal ordering of goals and objectives for realization of the desired end. Political policy to achieve these ends is, of course, prerequisite to attainment. The National Psyche, thus, defines societal long range objectives, realized through implementing political policy. Changes in values ascribed components, however, will affect national direction and final destination. A backazimuth from our current contemporary position indicates a departure from the traditional course. An understanding of variant cause is necessary, if we are to regain our original path.

NATIONAL PSYCHE - TRADITIONAL PERSPECTIVE

Traditional American psyche can be best described as involved and participative. It depicts a period characterized by national pride and belief in founding principles of hard work, best qualified, fair play, and democracy. The United States possessed moral ascendancy in fostering international democracy and perceived itself first militarily, industrially, and politically. Quality education, stressing the three R's (i.e. Reading, (W)Riting, and A(R)ithmatic) and solid foundations in scientific curricula were norms. High School education and subsequent graduation were considered prerequisite to full societal participation.

Traditional American focus was future oriented with national defense accommodated by universal suffrage in form of a selection lottery. Technologically, slide rules solved equations, men wearing green eye shades balanced budgets and manipulated stock markets, and Sputnik was the new boy on the block. Nationalism was the backbone of an American society exhibiting pioneer toughness, Christian values, democratic roots, and family bonding. In contemporary society, however, these characteristics have been all but juxtaposed.

NATIONAL PSYCHE - CONTEMPORARY FOCUS

Contemporary focus of the national psyche can be best described as detached and self oriented. Traditional values have been set aside and replaced with a preoccupation with self. This extremely limited orientation is evidenced by "I" replacing "We," and "My" in lieu of "Our" as possessives in discussion. Expansion of our democratic form of government has lost much of its previous zeal, while militarily, America struggles to retain its position of dominance. Political influence, once a fulcrum of international decisions, has significantly waned; and industrial production is unable to meet the challenge of European and Asian competitors. Other components of the national psyche have also changed.

Education has mutated from its traditional position. Quality education is available to a diminishing percentage of the population. Moreover, increasing numbers of high school drop outs and youth lacking basic educational skills are attempting, with diminishing success, to enter the work force. A poor educational base for American youth is far more prevalent than historical samplings portend and appears to be increasing annually.

National defense has also transitioned. An all volunteer force, mercenary in nature, discounts national obligatory service

as return for privileges and freedoms derived in a democratic society. Defense via mercenaries may, in the long run, prove self defeating. The luxury derived from fielding a highly trained, professional force in combat may be offset by the loss of universal service synergistic benefits during the substantially longer years of peace. Computers now replace slide rules and green shaded market manipulators; while space shuttles, questing lunar and planetary exploration, sit in for the Sputniks of old. The stage and the actors upon it have substantially changed, as have their goals and perspectives. A readjustment of aim from the traditional to the evolved contemporary target is warranted, therefore, if striking the bull's-eye remains the goal.

In three decades the nation has experienced accelerated technological change; diminished national orientation; constrained adventurism; and reduced propensity for proliferation of democracy. The influence of the Christian ethic has declined in consonance with the strength of national bonding. The variance between contemporary and traditional American psyches clearly implies change has occurred to the National Will derived therefrom.

DERIVATION OF THE NATIONAL WILL

The shape and texture of the National Will is predicated upon values, weight, assigned its moral, spiritual, and social variables at a particular point in time. Variable weights evolve in high correlation with societal maturation, redefinition of long range goals, and world affairs. These variables are dynamic and a function of time. An illustration will serve to verify this point. If the social component was evaluated with respect to societal agreement with American participation in foreign wars, a higher agreement ratio would be obtained for WWII than for Korea. Similarly, Korea would receive a higher agreement ratio than Viet Nam. A corollary can be drawn using the perceived Soviet threat during the same periods. In this instance the threat is highest in Viet Nam, less intense during Korea, and lowest in WWII. A similar assessment can be made for moral and spiritual variables of the national will. Outcomes will vary with respect to time as will their sums. Thus, the National Will, precursor of national objectives and direction, is a variable, as are its derivatives. One such derivative is the Army Ethic.

ARMY DIFFERENTIATION

Discussion of the Army ethic will be more meaningful once its unique requirements and special demands are differentiated from its civilian counterpart. The Military is a subset of society and reflects in a microcosm the norms, morays and folkways of society at large. Soldiers do not discount beliefs and values acquired as civilians, however, the military role necessitates norms of higher magnitude than those prevailing within the society. This greater need exists because of the Army's combat imperative. Men in combat undergo stress and doubt on a scale far greater than that experienced by civilians and require, therefore, greater bonding, esprit, trust, and belief in self. A soldier must overcome that which impedes other men, his fear, in order to accomplish a desired end. Moral, ethical, and behavioral standards must, therefore, provide a stronger base for appropriate collective behavior than that of the broader society.

As a result of the life supporting, life giving, and when called upon life taking roles soldiers may be called upon to play, they must, of necessity, march to the beat of a different drummer. A drummer having a higher moral calling and ethical code. For the modern soldier, this drummer is the Army Ethic.

THE ARMY ETHIC

"Knowledge of the principles of war and leadership must be anchored to professional value tenants such as Duty, Honor, Country; which are consistent with the larger moral, spiritual, and social values upon which the nation was founded."[1] "The Army Ethic, therefore, must be consistent with the national will, purpose, and ethic from which it flows."[2] Foremost must be the commitment "to support and defend the Constitution of the United States."[3] To this end certain values have been identified as crucial. These values are "loyalty, duty, selfless service, and integrity - four cornerstones of the professional Army ethic."[4,5,6]

The Army ethic sets the moral context of the Army in its service to the nation and inspires the sense of purpose necessary to preserve the nation even by the use of military force. Fundamental to the ethic are "*loyalty* - to the nation, Army, and the unit; __duty__ - obedience and disciplined performance despite difficulty or danger, and acceptance of responsibility for personal and collective action; __selfless service__ - placing the welfare of the nation and accomplishment of the mission ahead of individual desires despite sacrifice; and __integrity__ - honesty, uprightness, and avoidance of deception."[7] Lieutenant General D.C.

Smith, Jr. USA (Ret), in comments to the USAWC class of 1988, 26 January 1988, stated "Should military goals and objectives differ from those of the society, difficulties will inevitably ensue."[8] This is an interesting perspective, seemingly valid in premise. Closer scrutiny, however, discloses a significant error in the deductive conclusion. "In that the Army ethic is a derivative of the national will, continuity of purpose and ends must ensue."[8] Should this not be the case, an error has been made in formulation of the ethic. Clausewitz perceived military activity to be an extension of political objectives and subordinated thereto. The ship of state, therefore, is captained by political ambitions and supported by a military having a high correlation with its moral and ethical mandates. There is however, strong correlation between strength and texture of societies moral/ethical sinew and the military. Consequently, fluctuation in morality or ethical perspective in society has similar affect on the Army Ethic.

SOLDIER VALUES

The strength of the professional Army ethic, derived from National Will is dependent upon cultivation of specific individual values in soldiers. These values are "commitment – to the ethic and to national goals; competence – proficiency in ones realm of

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responsibility; <u>candor</u> - honesty and fidelity to the truth; and <u>courage</u> - moral and physical courage necessary to abate fear and accomplish missions despite impediments."[9,10,11] Simply possessing these values, however, may not suffice to accomplish desired ends. There is an additional need for soldiers to mature physically, socially, emotionally, and spiritually. Maturation indicators are "<u>self-discipline</u> - clear thinking and reasonable action under stress of combat; <u>initiative</u> - to operate within the commanders' intent; <u>judgement</u> - deductive ability culminating in deriving a feasible course of action; and <u>confidence</u> - to accomplish the objective."[12]

WARRIOR SPIRIT

Underpinning National Will and Army ethic are philosophical and, therefore, not easily articulated to the field soldier whose cosmos is, for the most part, company, battalion, or brigade. Soldiers do not easily focus on ideology to the same degree they do buddies with whom they have intimate interface and share danger. These relationships foster a pride, esprit, and bonding found in few other areas."[13] The beliefs (national psyche, national will, Army ethic), values (commitment, competence, courage, candor), and norms (discipline, initiative, judgement,

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confidence), of the American fighting man endow him with moral ascendancy and an ethos of victory - the warrior spirit.

CONCLUSION

The national psyche ascribes discrete values to components of the national will for the purpose of defining societal long range goals, attained through directed political decision. The military, as extension of the body politic, derives its ethic by increasing import of societal moral and ethical components. This increase in value is essential to fostering self-confidence, esprit, trust, and bonding required of soldiers in combat. The Army ethic is derived from the national will and strengthened by soldier values. With maturation, the culmination of these multiple national psyche derivatives is the warrior spirit, an ethos espoused by American fighting men giving them moral ascendancy and increased probability of victory. Strong correlation between national will and Army ethic implies a shift in the former will have comparable affect on the latter. This shift has occurred. Thus, the seeds of erosion are sown in the profession of arms.

ENDNOTES

1. U.S. Department Of The Army, FM 100-1, p. 21.

2. Ibid., p. 21.

3. Ibid., p. 21.

4. Ibid., p. 22.

5. U.S. Department Of The Army, FM 22-102, pp. 4-5.

6. U.S. Department Of The Army, FM 22-100, p. 86.

7. U.S. Department Of The Army, FM 22-102, pp. 4-5.

8. U.S. Department Of The Army, FM 100-1, p., 21.

9. Ibid., p. 23

10. U.S. Department Of The Army, FM 22-102, pp. 5-6.

11. U.S. Department Of The Army, FM 22-100, pp. 90-91.

12. U.S. Department Of The Army, FM 22-102, pp. 3-4

13. U.S. Department Of The Army, FM 100-1, pp. 23-24.

CHAPTER III

ETHICAL EROSION

THE BEGINNING

Watergate shattered the foundation of the national will and dealt a knockout blow to political ethics. In its wake lies a myriad of prohibitive legislation and system checks whose intent is to negate future constitutional violation and national embarrassment. The President, Richard M. Nixon, besieged by the legislature and national press, was ultimately trapped with only his tapes. His resulting resignation and subsequent pardon by President Gerald R. Ford were the keynote to an ethical decline in the 1970's. Not only the Presidency, but our institutions of honor also fell before the awesome onslaught of the corrosive ethical tides.

Cheating scandals of major proportion rocked the United States Military Academy at West Point and the Air Force Academy in Boulder, Colorado. Such incongruous behavior at institutions founded on the principles of Duty, Honor, Country; and an ethical code espousing 'A Cadet will not lie, cheat, or steal nor tolerate those that do,' rocked the uniformed services ethical foundations. These were events of import in that they revealed the extent to

which the profession of arms was suffering from its ethical malady.

The scandals came at a time the nation was questioning its internal and international direction in wake of Viet Nam and the equality struggles of the 1960's. Memories of the My Lai massacre and questionable body counts were still focused in the national conscious. Add to this the Advent of an all volunteer fighting force, draft elimination, and national desire to return to policies of isolationism. The cumulative weight of these issues further eroded the ethical pillars as the Army frantically fought to retain historical prominence. Moral fibers were strained. It was at this time the US Army War College conducted its study On Military Professionalism. By so doing, the ethical viewpoints of men and women at arms were brought into sharper focus.

MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM - 1970

The USAWC Study On Military Professionalism was an overdue effort on the part of the Army to assess status of the officer corps as perceived by active duty officers of the time. "The central theme of the study was to determine whether or not a variance, i.e. difference, existed between the Army's stated moral-ethical environments espoused by academia, a plethora of FMs, TMs, ARs and associated literature; and the environment actually

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existing in the Army."[1] It was hoped the difference between actual and ideal could be identified, analyzed, and corrected. Existence of variance was expected, its severity was not.

The variance was accounted for through assessment of differences in two broad categories, these being ethics and competence. Further analysis and data refinement resulted in identification of thirty-four areas in which deviations from desirable goals were identified. This unwieldy figure was refined to fourteen.

Efficiency reports have been traditionally heralded as a sore point in the Army and topped the list in import.

> "Most officers expressed deep concern the OER was improperly utilized. Secondary concern was focused on inability of senior officers to delegate authority for accomplishing sensitive missions. These concerns were closely followed by 'setting a good example,' and 'loyalty to subordinates.'"[2]

These themes frequently recurred in the study and the symptoms by which they could be identified in the unit were deductively derived. Causes were grouped into two categories, appraisal and assignment systems, towards which corrective action was to be addressed. Five corrective themes and ten solutions were proposed and may be found in appendices "4 through 6."[3] As is frequently the case, solutions oriented more on the symptoms than true causes of variance.

The present inflated officer efficiency report is a solution to the previous inflated officer efficiency report. Raters have bequeathed discriminating responsibility to senior raters who have likewise shifted this responsibility to boards. Unwillingness of raters and senior raters to discriminate among officers remains the cause of inflation, yet, format is again assailed as the culprit.

The 1970 professionalism study was an aggressive start towards resolving many post Viet Nam problems. It identified the cause for variance from the ideal and forwarded ten solutions for remedying the deviation found in four categorical areas. These areas were communications, performance, leadership, and ethics. Many of the recommendations of this study were instituted, however, subsequent studies seem to indicate corrective action was only partially successful in eradicating problems. The 1986 Iran-Contra affair appears to have served as catalyst to again elevate military performance and ethics to a position of prominence in the American psyche. This fact may have spurred the U.S. Army War College 1987 survey to ascertain the prevailing ethical clime. It was no surprise the conclusions of this study closely paralleled those of the 1970 effort. From a different perspective, however, the outcomes are staggering.

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ETHICS - 1987

The purpose of the United States Army War College 1987 study _Ethics - Do Senior Officers Walk Where They Talk_ was to determine "if todays senior leaders are in fact promoting and developing the professional Army ethic"[4] as previously defined in chapter II. The sampling population was the 1987 War College student body. The survey consisted of 43 questions "... measured with a Likert scale."[5]

The Likert scale utilizes nine response categories from strongly agree to strongly disagree. The scales intent is to measure strength of convictions, or lack thereof. A statement such as 'Today is Tuesday,' however, is inappropriate for measurement with this scale. There are but two outcomes. Either it is Tuesday, or it is not. Actually, a third category exists when a respondent has insufficient data upon which to base a response. This was not the case with the 1987 sampling population. Most questions were binary and indifferent responses fell within the purview of one of the principal categories. When appropriate the indifferent category was evaluated on its own merit. For these reasons the Likert scale may not have been the appropriate tool for analysis and may have introduced some bias into interpretation of outcomes.

The study's initial statement was "When it came to ethical areas there were no grey areas."[6] Only two outcomes exist for this statement. An indifferent response confirms grey areas and can, therefore, be considered a negative response. Questions are mutually exclusive. The greater the difference between positive and negative responses the stronger the conviction. Questions have been grouped into performance, communication, leadership, and ethics categories to facilitate comparison with the 1970 outcomes. This analysis technique provides a more accurate assessment of 1987 data than does the Likert Scale.

LEADERSHIP

Favorable leadership outcomes were obtained in demonstrating confidence in subordinates; establishing and enforcing high standards in the organization; and exhibition of nonbiased behavior towards minority groups. Nonbiased behavior towards minorities was the highest leadership rating with 89% favorable responses. Less desirable outcomes were derived for self-serving behavior and conduct of training on values. Sixty percent of respondents felt leaders failed to address behavior nonsupportive of organizational ends. Partial cause for this finding is the reluctance to confront subordinates with

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performance expectations and proper mentoring to realize desired behavior. Communicative shortcomings are also contributors to this normative variant.

A second deviation from the norm was in the leadership failing to conduct organizational training on values. Here, too, organizational communications come into question. Similarly, serious questions arise with respect to a leader's knowledge of values and with his ability to inculcate his moral and ethical perspectives into the organizations collective conscience. The failure of leadership to become actively involved with establishing the organizations moral conscience might be an educational shortcoming. This would seem to suggest a requirement for instruction in prepatory military educational regimens.

Leaders must clearly define acceptable behavior, organizational values, and ethical environment in reaching desired goals and objectives. Swift corrective action must ensue for subordinates failing to internalize these behavioral norms.

COMMUNICATIONS

The need to improve organizational communications was detected to differing degrees in outcomes of every category. Mean positive responses for communication statements were lowest of the

four assessed areas. This infers that the elimination of communication inhibitors within the organization should be the number one priority. Emphasis here will synergistically improve outcomes in the three other categories. Effective communications require open channels for sending an receiving information in two directions. The information transfer must pass both good and bad information throughout the organization. One third of the sample population felt barriers existed which stopped negative information from getting to senior leaders. This fact tends to alienate leaders from the full spectrum of information necessary for decision making and discount, to some degree, the veracity of decisions predicated thereon. Partial cause for this deficiency is 1 of 4 leaders failing to conduct regularly scheduled counseling, or footlocker counseling when appropriate. As a result, counseling must receive higher scheduling priority and communication filters must be removed. The affect will be improved decision effectiveness and greater propensity for achievement of organizational goals.

The most deficient area requiring improvement was compliance with regulatory proviso for collective performance goal setting. In formulating the 67-8-1, Officer Evaluation Support Form, leaders must delineate ethical expectations and

organizational values for subordinates. Fifty-nine percent of respondents felt support form goal setting sessions failed to address organizational values or ethical norms. This is somewhat understandable in view of the normative use of the support form as an after action report of performance rendered, rather than a planning contract for performance desired. Malutilization of the form is also linked to leadership failings in conducting performance counseling, and to sensitivities involved in discussing ethics and values in general. These inhibiting sensitivities are exacerbated when discussions are with senior officers as were respondents in the 1987 sample population. Sixty percent (60%) of respondents felt need exists for improvement in this area.

Leadership counseling to define performance expectations and discern organizational values and ethics are imperative, and the commander's responsibility. Both good and bad information must flow freely within the organization. Only with the benefit of all available, and relative, information can the senior leader make decisions in support of defined goals and objectives. Removal of information barriers is important to improving organizational efficiency and to increasing potential for mission accomplishment. Leaders must be sensitive to the fact their manner of handling information will greatly influence its effectiveness and manner by which it is processed within the organization.

PERFORMANCE

Performance parameters focused on leadership technical proficiency; physical, and ethical personal performance. The 1987 USAWC Ethics study optimistically interpreted survey data and presented a somewhat biased outcome. Because of this skewed orientation, certain warning signals imbedded within the data may have gone unnoticed. The relatively flat slope of outcomes in the performance graph; Appendix 7, Annex B, Tab 2; denotes a consistent distribution of responses within the category. Leader technical competence was favorably assessed by 80% of the respondents, and leader personal appearance viewed favorably by 75%. Favorable outcomes of 66% ensued for fitness and ethical considerations. A different portrait of these values is painted, however, when viewed from a minority perspective.

The minority view discloses one third of our senior leaders fail to serve as ethical role models, or set physical fitness organizational norms through personal example. Additionally, 30% of the sampling population felt their leaders did not live out ethical standards in either the duty or social environments, and twenty percent (20%) were viewed as technically deficient. These assessments mandate immediate corrective action. Outcomes of this nature are even more disconcerting when one

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considers the meticulous screening and selection process which placed these officers in key leadership positions. Senior leader deficiencies of this nature can only serve to diminish organizational effectiveness, fuel fires of discontent, diminish esprit, and negate cohesion. Compliance with performance expectations must apply to all within the unit; especially to the commander.

ETHICS

The initial statement of the 1987 USAWC study on ethics was "When it came to ethical standards there were no grey areas." To this statement, 36% of of the sampling population responded negatively. This interprets as 1 of every 3 sampled officers felt there were ethical 'grey areas' in the organization. This response set the mode for the less than desirable outcomes in the leadership ethics category.

One third of the sample felt organizational members with strong ethical convictions were viewed by senior leaders as not being team players. A comparable percentage thought senior leaders avoided discussing ethical issues; tolerated distortion in reports to higher headquarters; and covered up incidents which tended to diminish the effectiveness of either the leader or the unit. Couple

these outcomes with a one third (33%) assessment, leaders took credit for work or accomplishments rightfully belonging to others; and failed to emphasize demanding environments do not justify 'bending' ethical norms. A less than desirable military environment ensues when viewed in this light. Of further import is 53% of the sample did not feel their leaders characterized the essence of the Officer Creed, i.e. not lying, cheating, or stealing nor tolerating those that do; and 29% were of the opinion 'Do as I say, not as I do,' characterized their superiors leadership ethic. There should also be concern about the results that imply the following: 25% of senior leaders allow demands for meeting goals to foster unethical behavior; 20% rewarded known unethical behavior; and 21% knowingly providing higher headquarters with less than honest reports.

Without doubt, serious concern regarding leadership ethics should arise from this perspective on outcomes of the 1987 study. Most senior military leaders would find these results unacceptable. A 90-95% compliance with expectations is a reasonable goal considering the skewed intellectual and performance population from which senior leaders are drawn. These acceptable levels are, however, far distant from the 70%-80% outcomes implied by the 1987 USAWC study. Negative outcomes of this magnitude require immediate corrective action. They also answer the hypothesis of the 1987

study *Ethics - Do Senior Officers Walk Where They Talk?*. In this authors opinion the answer is an unequivocally NO! They do not! The results seem to indicate that an alarmingly high number of senior officers do not walk where they talk.

ETHICAL PERSPECTIVE - 1988

USAWC students in 1988, again delved into measuring ethical parameters of the Army. To obtain the ethical pulse, Lieutenant Colonel Bill Braun conducted a survey, again using War College students as the sampling population. The survey sought to answer his hypothesis - the Army's ethical climate is not in need of improvement. The results of this survey were also quite revealing.

Colonel Brauns' outcomes in communications, leadership, performance, and ethics closely paralleled those of the 1987 study. "Most officers considered their superiors technically competent,"[7] intelligent, and capable of accomplishing their respective missions. "High ratings were also derived for non biased behavior towards minority groups. In the rare instance biased behavior was indicated, it related to subordinate women as opposed to ethnic groups."[8] Discounting this spike in the curve, leaders fared well in terms of providing equal opportunities for subordinates to

develop. Not all outcomes, however, were positive.

Serious concern was expressed in four areas. One such area was intolerance for subordinate mistakes. Here, 24% of the respondents felt their leaders were deficient. A similar 24% also felt their leaders were self serving and overly concerned with personal achievement and advancement. Twenty-nine percent (29%) stated senior communication skills were in need of significant improvement for their organizations to efficiently operate. The most searing indictment came, however, with respect to ethics. A staggering "37% of USAWC students stated their commanders failed to set the moral and ethical climate through personal example and taught neither ethics nor values in their organizations."[9] These 1988 survey outcomes are, again, sad indictments on the state of Army ethics.

Colonel Braun rejected the null hypothesis of his study and accepted the alternate hypothesis there is need for improvement in Army ethics. His recommendations included "additional ethical training in Army school curriculum; increased command emphasis on teaching values and ethics in military units; and leadership by example. He also felt organizational ethical climate, leadership, and education should be a point of interest during Inspector General assistance visits. Lastly, Colonel Braun felt ethical

issues and compliance with desired value norms should be mandatory comments by both rater and senior rater on officer efficiency reports. In similar vein he suggested the OER system be modified to reduce present inflation and provide a useful tool to discriminate officer performance by both rater and senior rater as intended."[10]

Three studies in two decades on the same subject, Army ethics, have reached similar conclusions. Significantly more effort is required to close the separation between the actual and desirable ethical environments. It is clear the time to begin is NOW!

ENDNOTES

1. U.S. Army War College, Study On Military Professionalism, p. iii.

2. Ibid., p. B-26.

3. Ibid., pp. B31, B36-B38, B48

4. Joseph O. York, LTC, Douglad D. Walterhouse, LTC, Robert G. McWard, LTC, Daniel H. Bolen, LTC, Ethics - Do Senior Officers Walk Where They Talk, p. ii.

5. Ibid., p. 3.

6. Ibid., p. 15.

7. Bill Braun, LTC, An Ethical Army Leadership - Real or Wanting?, p. 30.

8. Ibid., p. 30.

9. Ibid., p. 32.

10 Ibid., p. 33.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSIONS

The national psyche has evolved. Ninety percent (90%) of a national survey attributed national ethical erosion to "parental failure to take responsibility for the moral-ethical development of their children."[1] Contributing causes were "unethical business practices (76%), immoral politicians (74%), and crooked lawyers (44%)."[2] The study further concluded the "American society has a diminished sense of commitment and an increased focus on self."[3] This societal shift constitutes traditional to contemporary evolution of the national psyche. To many, it has gone unnoted. The time is now for America to reexamine the values it so seductively parades before the populace and truthfully determine their measure. "A realignment of thinking is required to redefine 'wants' so they serve society as well as self in achieving rightful ends."[4] The nations moral-ethical center of gravity is defined by popular perspective. Traditionally, this perspective was extroverted and oriented on the nations well being. The perspective is now introverted and focused on the individual. This change in national focus has displaced the moral-ethical center of gravity. The national will and Army ethic derived from the center of gravity have also changed. The change has not been for the better. Return

to a more traditional perspective is desirable as are the positive moral-ethical affects resulting therefrom.

Many ethical observers are of the opinion the Reagan administration has contributed to political moral-ethical erosion more so than predecessors. "Unlike historic breeches which were more or less centralized the Reagan administration appears to have suffered a breakdown of the immune system, opening the way to all kinds of ethical and moral infection."[5] Over 100 Reagan appointees have resigned posts for moral-ethical or other grounds of impropriety. The Attorney General, Edwin Meese, remains besieged with unethical allegations and may be indicted by one of several Special Prosecutors delving into alleged misdeeds. The President, however, pretends "to be oblivious to the ethical chaos about him caused in great part by his permissiveness, moral lassitude, and unwillingness to admit even the slightest responsibility for the terrible state of political ethics."[6] Although this administration is the culmination of political ethical decline, it is by no means the origin.

Presidential misrepresentation of the truth has almost become an expectation from the office once considered the national ethical model. "President Reagan lied to the nation regarding his knowledge of Contra sustainment, an issue on which he subsequently

reversed himself. President Johnson lied about expanding the Viet Nam war; President Nixon lied about his Watergate involvement; and President Jimmy Carter lied about his intent to carry out the Desert One rescue mission."[7] "A leader who lies or tells a half-truth to make his unit look good on a report may think he is doing his duty and being loyal to his commander and unit. In fact, he is being dishonorable and unethical, neglecting his duty to the Army and the nation. A leader cannot truly do his duty without being honorable."[8] Erosion of values and ethics in the office of the president mirrors a comparable decline in the legislative branch.

"The story is both sad and sordid. People of great character and ability, holding positions of trust and authority in our government, were drawn into a web of deception and despair."[9] This statement by leader of the Senate Iran-Contra committee, Daniel Inouye of Hawaii, preceded his subsequent request for withdrawal of a bill he improperly championed for a special interest group. His counterpart in the House, Joe Biden, withdrew from the 1988 presidential race for plagiarism. These are but tips of the iceberg. Political ethical erosion goes much deeper.

The degree of congressional moral-ethical erosion is yet to be quantified, yet, it is greater than desirable. A 1987 congressional study disclosed "20% of the congressmen queried

admitted they had allowed political contributions to influence their legislative vote. Another 30% were not sure if they had or not."[10] Special prosecutor investigations are focused on "Speaker of the House Jim Wrights' alleged legislative intervention on behalf of Texas savings and loan associations; Senator Austin Murphy allows others to vote his voting card;"[11] and Congressman Biaggi is being removed from office for accepting free vacations for political favors. Ethical erosion is increasingly evident in the executive and legislative branches from whom the national will is derived. The Army ethic is also affected.

Political impact on the Army Ethic is best described by Aristotle's pronouncement, "People in government exercise a teaching function. Unfortunately, when they do things underhanded and dishonest, that teaches too."[12]

Underhanded and dishonest acts by senior military officers further tarnish the ethical armor of the profession of arms. Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North and Admiral Poindexter of Irangate fame lead the list of officers bringing dishonor to their service. Their attitudes were "justifiable revenge against the system. Similar to Charles Bronson, Clint Eastwood, Rambo et. al. If the system will not allow us - we'll get the job done our way,"[13] i.e. work outside the system. Other possible violators include BG (RES)

Edwin Meese, COL (RET) McFarlan, MG Richard Secord, and retired general John Singlaub. Additionally, COL (RET) Robert Dulton, "GEN (RET) Alexander Haig, Brent Scowcroft and Stansfield Turner"[14] were participants in less than desirable activities in pervious administrations. "Seventeen of fifty NSC staffers are military officers"[15] and viewed in the light of the administration of which they are part. The impact of these associations is a dagger in our ethical heart as reflected by former Marine Corps Commandant P.X. Kelly. He emphasized the need to reinstate faith in the motto Semper Fidelis (Always Faithful) in order to regain the ethical high ground. These events have not transpired in isolation and their impact is clearly evident in outcomes of three ethical studies.

Outcomes of 1970, 1987, and 1988 USAWC studies are striking in consistency and in similarity of findings. They leave little doubt regarding components of the Army operational environment requiring emphasis to diminish variance from desired normative behavior. The leading deviation component is the Officer Evaluation Report and its attendant inflation, distortion, and malutilization. Selfish, ambitious, self serving behavior on the part of the leader also remains problematic. Too much careerism continues to exist. Over supervision of subordinates by failing to delegate responsibility, lack of freedom of action in accomplishing

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objectives, and intolerance of mistakes are serious concerns of the sample population.

The Officer's Creed has lost some of its import as evidenced by increased testimony to the fact that lying, cheating, and stealing in support of organizational objectives is far too often tolerated. This closely parallels the fact senior officers are increasingly concerned with results and less concerned with the means by which they are realized. Additionally, leaders are less tolerant of anything with potential negative impact on them or their organizations, and more frequently tend to look the other way rather than confront deviant behavior. This is in part a result of an inappropriate Army awards system which advances those passing certain career gates, with only limited information describing the moral ethical manner by which success was achieved. Some aspects of the assignment system still require fine tuning.

Poor organizational communications and attendant inefficiencies remain problematic as does compliance with regulatory counseling mandates. Leaders demonstrate an ineptitude towards getting the word out in their organizations; not defining performance objectives; or in actively seeking to remove filters and communication inhibitors within the organization. Leaders do not have desired open channels with subordinates. There remains an

upward filtering of information with resulting leader deprivation of complete information in support of the decision process. The senior leader is far too frequently failing to set normative behavior through personal example. Too much of a "do as I say not as I do" attitude permeates military organizations. A reversal of these communication inhibitors is imperative.

The most searing negative indictment derived from the three studies is that far too many senior leaders fail to set the moral-ethical climate of their organizations. A significant deficiency remains regarding teaching of values and ethics, in consonance with their application in the duty environment. Too many ethical grey areas continue to exist and contribute to the Army's ethical decline of the 1980's.

The nations' ethical system is in immediate need of improvement. Irangate, with its contingent of military participants, and outcomes of three separate U.S. Army War College ethical studies also tend to support a needfor improvement. The moral-ethical tree grows from the roots of the national psyche. Its trunk is the national will; branches the Army Ethic; and leaves practicing values and ethics. It baths in the sunshine of democracy. Plucking leaves and severing branches will not totally diminish the variance between practicing and desirable norms. The

root causes are much deeper. Yet, within the framework the Army can influence there is much that can be done to derive closer correlation with the ethical goal. This is the only alternative left the Army to restore the splendor of what may otherwise remain . . .

TARNISHED ARMOR

> "The last best hope of earth, two trillion dollars in debt, is spinning out of control, and all we can do is stare at the cathode-ray tube as Ollie "answers" questions on T.V. while the press, resolutely irrelevant as ever, asks politicians if they have committed adultery. From V-J Day 1945, to this, has been, my fellow countrymen, a perfect nightmare."[16]

ENDNOTES

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2. Ibid., p. 26.

3. Ibid., p. 27.

4. Ibid., p. 27.

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7. Hosenball, Mark. "The Culture Of Lying." _New Republic_, Vol., 197, No. 2&3, 13&20 July 1987, p. 16.

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10. "Slap and Tickle." _The Economist_, Vol. 306, No. 753, 12 January 1988, p. 23.

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12. Shapiro, Walter. "What's Wrong." _Time_, Vol., MXXIX, No. 21, 25 May 1987, p. 14.

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14. Ibid., p. 13.

15. Ibid., p. 14.

16. Vidal, Gore. "The Con-Man as Pecks' Bad Boy." _Newsweek_, Vol. CX, No. 2, 13 July 1987, p. 20.

CHAPTER V

RECOMMENDATIONS

Corrective measure tor behavior deviating from the norm is not always new forms, systems, or procedures. In some instances corrective measures become as problematic as were the problems they sought to correct. Often, solutions are simply compliance with rules and regulations already in effect. To a significant degree, this is the case with recommended solutions to undesirable ethical behavior described in this study effort. Some difficulty with monitoring compliance arises, however, from the fact the subjects of this analysis are senior military officers. The question becomes, therefore, who checks the boss? The answer is not difficult, the checkers are the senior leaders next two higher superiors and the Inspector General. It is here compliance will be monitored.

Increased ethical education is the key. Value and ethical education in Officer Basic Course, Advance Course, CAS-3, USAWC et al, are far too general. They deal with the utopian ideal and assume officers will miraculously make the necessary transition from theoretical to applied when need arises. This perspective is naive at best. Its underlying premise is that officers are already

significantly aware of ethical norms, a proposition discounted by the Army Inspector General who stated that regulatory violations among officers is on the increase. Required is a more comprehensive moral-ethical educational program for senior leaders. A restructuring of present curriculums will probably meet this need. The instruction should focus on case studies and interaction with experts in the moral-ethical field. Experts should include serving Inspector Generals and judge advocate general officers. Acceptable and nonacceptable behaviors should be clearly defined as should the senior leaders role in teaching ethics within the organization. Additionally, techniques to assess the moral-ethical climate of the organization and means to positively influence ethical norms should be taught. Most ethical programs are too general in nature. Greater specificity is required.

Education also plays a role in solving organizational communications problems. Leaders require instruction regarding identification of communication inhibitors and means to dispel them. The 67-8-1 OER Support Form must be used to establish expectations, inclusive of ethical behavior. Semiannual officer counseling should be a mandatory requirement for raters. These signed counseling statements and the current 67-8-1 should be forwarded to the senior rater with the Officer Evaluation Report.

Raters should be required to comment on ethics in the OER. Footlocker counseling and mentoring should become points of interest in rater, senior rater, and IG visits.

Leadership by example has been a keystone in the American Army since inception. Deviation from this norm should not be tolerated. Leaders failing to meet regulatory standards should be removed from leadership positions. Setting the moral-ethical example through personal action is also imperative. "Do as I say not as I do" viewpoints are inappropriate and should not be tolerated. Present procedures for selecting leaders should be retained; however, board members should be instructed to scrutinize records closely for moral-ethical compliance. Again, these are areas of interest for rater, senior rater, and IG visits.

Systems are in place to foster compliance and significantly improve the moral-ethical component of Army Life. Reenergizing and monitoring these systems is required. By so doing we will erase the tarnish now prevalent on the Army's moral-ethical armor and restore the brilliance of yesterday.

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ROGUE'S GALLERY
ETHICAL MISCONDUCT

"More than 100 members of the Reagan Administration have had ethical or legal charges leveled against them. While the Reagan Administration's missteps may not have been as flagerant as the TeaPot Dome scandal or as pernicious as Watergate, they seem more general, more pervasive and somehow more ingrained than those of any other Administration. During other presidencies, scandals such as the Watergate seemed to multiply from a single cancer; the Reagan Administration, however, appears to have suffered a breakdown of the immune system, opening the way to all kinds of ethical and moral infections."

#	Name	Position	Charge
1.	Richard Allen	National Security Advisor	$1,000 honorarium
2.	James Beggs	Chief Administrator, NASA	Defrauding government
3.	Ann Burford	EPA Administrator	Industrial fraud
4.	Carlos Campbell	Asst. Sec. Commerce	False award of grants
5.	William Casey	Director, CIA	Iran-Contra
6.	Michael Deaver	Dep. White House COS	Ethical violations
7.	Raymond Donovan	Secretary Of Labor	$7.4 million fraud
8.	John Fenders	Chief Enforcement SEC	Wife Beater
9.	Guy Fiske	Dep. Sec. Commerce	Conflict of Interest
10.	Louis Giuffrida	Dir. Emerg. Mgt. Agency	Misuse Gov't property
11.	Edwin Gray	Chairman Home Loan Bank	Unauthorized use $26,000
12.	Arthur Hayes	Commissioner, FDA	Fradulant travel claims
13.	J. Lynn Helms	Chief, Fed. Aviation	Illegal Business
14.	John Hernandez	Actg. EPA Administrator	Ethical compromise
15.	Robert Hill	Econ. Devel. Admin.	Accepting Gratuity
16.	John Horton	Asst. EPA Admin.	Misuse gov't employees
17.	Max Hugel	CIA, Chief Covert Ops.	Finance fraud
18.	Rita Lavelle	EPA Asst. Admin.	Perjury
19.	Robert McFarlane	National Security Advisor	Iran-contra
20.	M. Mecklenburg	Dep. Asst. Sec. HHD	Fradulant travel
21.	Edwin Meese	Attorney General	Wedtech Corp.
22.	J. Miller	Dep. Asst. to President	Iran-contra
23.	Robert Nimmo	Head Veterans Admin.	Misuse gov't services
24.	Lyn Nofziger	White House Aid	Wedtech Corp.
25.	Oliver North	National Security Council	Iran-contra
26.	Matthew Novick	EPA Inspector General	Misuse gov't employees
27.	Theodore Olson	Asst. Attorney General	Obstructing justice
28.	Robert Perry	EPA General Counsel	Ethical compromise

ROUGE'S GALLERY
ETHICAL MISCONDUCT
(CONTINUED)

29.	J. W. Petro	U.S. Attorney, Cleveland	Obstructing justice
30.	John Poindexter	National Security Advisor	Iran-contra
31.	Thomas Reed	White House Counselor	Misuse $427,000
32.	Emanuel Savas	Asst. Sec. HUD	Misuse gov't employees
33.	Victor Schroeder	Pres. Synthetic Fuels	False gov't billing
34.	Richard Secord	Air Force MG (Ret)	Iran-contra and Fraud
35.	Victor Tohmpson	Pres. Synthetic Fuels	Violated ethic rules
36.	John Todhunter	Asst. EPA Administrator	Ethical misconduct
37.	Peter Voss	Postal Service Governor	Accepting kickbacks
38.	James Watt	Secretary of Interior	Controversial remarks
39.	Charles Wick	Dir. U.S. Info. Agency	Taped conversations

THROWING IT ALL AWAY
ETHICAL MISCONDUCT

"Not since the reckless 1920s and the desperate 1930s have the financial...," and editorial "columns carried such unrelenting tales of vivid scandals, rascally characters and creative new means for dirty-dealing (insider trading, money laundering, greenmailing)." Following are some of the personages contributing to this era of questionable ethics and amoral behavior.

1.	Robert Anderson	Consultant	Illegal banking
2.	Charles Atkins	Tax-shelter Promoter	$550 Mil fraudulant taxes
3.	Ivan Boesky	Wall Street Arbitrager	Inside trading
4.	Jacob Butcher	Tennessee Banker	Bank fraud
5.	John Galanis	Tax-shelter Promoter	Bilking $115 million
6.	Aldo Gucci	International Fashion	Tax evasion
7.	Boyd Jefferies	Security Trader	Falsifying records
8.	Dennis Levine	Investment Banker	Stock fraud
9.	Albert Nipon	Woman's Clothing	Tax evasion
10.	Victor Posner	Industrialist	Tax evasion $1.2 million
11.	Marc Rich	Commodity Trader	Tax evasion, $48 million
12.	Martin Siegel	Merger Guru	Sale of stock tips
13.	Paul Thayer	Chairman, LTV Corp.	Insider trading
14.	Marvin Warner	Owner, Home State Savings	Collapse of Ohio Thrift
15.	Jim&Tammy Bakker	Televangelist	Ethical misconduct
16.	Gary Hart	Presidential Candidate	Adultry
17.	Clayton Lonetree	Marine Embassy Guard	Deriliction of duty
18.	Pat Robinson	Presidential Candidate	Falsification of fact
19.	Joeseph Biden	Presidential Candidate	Plagery
20.	Marion Berry	Mayor Washington, D.C.	Illegal gifts
21.	Mrs Marion Berry	Mayor Berry's ex-wife	Diversion Fed. funds
22.	Andrew Young	Mayor, Atlanta, GA	Questionable ethics
23.	Julian Bond	Georgia Senator	Alledged cocaine use
24.	Jay Pollard	Intelligence Analyst	Spying for Isreal
25.	Arnold Bracy	Moscow Embassy Guard	Deriliction of duty
26.	John Weirick	Leningrad Counsulate Guard	Sex and Spy Scandle

APPENDIX 3

BEYOND THE ETHICAL BARRIER
ETHICAL ISSUES REQUIRING RESOLUTION

1. Televangelism   "Holygate."

2. Oral Roberts   "God Will Take Me Home!"

3. Medical Manipulation of Birth   Cloning, vitro fertilization et al

4. Surragate Motherhood   Baby Jane case et al

5. Pentagon Contracting $1,118.26 stool leg plastic cap

6. Morton Thiokol   Space Shuttle Challanger disaster

7. General Dynamics   F16 Electrical Wiring

8. A. H. Robins Co.   Dalkon Shield intrauterine device

9. Audi Coorporation   Audi 5000 mechanical failures

10. Computer Programing Theft $9.5 million check to bogus government
                                        contractor. Unis Williams programmer

11. Northrop Corporation   Internal guidance systems for the MX -
                                        Peacekeeper missile system in Wyoming.
                                        Several do not function.

12. Bess Myerson   Obstruction of justice in attempting
                                        to influence a judge on behalf of her
                                        boyfriend.

APPENDIX 4
DIVERGENCE THEMES [1]
(Extracted from USAWC Professionalism Study)
1970

(1)   Distortion of reports, including OERs.

(2)   Selfish/ambitious behavior; passing the buck.

(3)   Oversupervision, "don't rock the boat."

(4)   Technical incompetence.

(5)   Varying standards (grades, units).

(6)   Lying, cheating, stealing.

(7)   Acceptance of substandard officer.

(8)   Army system of rewards.

(9)   Lack of esprit and pride.

(10) Poor Army image.

(11) Mission accomplishment regardless of means or importance.

1.   York O. Joseph, LTC, Douglas D. Walterhouse, LTC, Robert G. McWard, LTC,
Daniel H. Bolen, LTC, Ethics - Do Senior Officers Walk Where They Talk?
Thesis. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 23 March 1987.

APPENDIX 5

CAUSES FOR NORMATIVE VARIANCE [1]
(Extracted from USAWC Study on Professionalism)
1970

NO TIME OR EXCUSE FOR FAILURE
TICKET PUNCHING
STATISTICAL PRESSURE
IMPROPER GOALS, DEMANDS, AND QUOTAS
LACK OF STABILITY IN LENGTH OF ASSIGNMENTS
INADEQUATE TIME IN GRADE
PRESSURE TO REMAIN COMPEDITIVE
COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY
REQUIRING EXPERTISE IN TOO MANY AREAS
PERMISSIVE SOCIETY
REQUIREMENT FOR MORE OFFICERS
INADEQUATE ELIMINATION OF OFFICERS
INSUFFICIENT COUNSELING
INSUFFICIENT SETTING OF STANDARDS
LEGALISM
LOYALTY UP - NOT DOWN
FAILURE TO ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY FOR OWN ACTIONS
LACK OF MORAL COURAGE AND SELF DISCIPLINE

1. York O. Joseph, LTC, Douglas D. Walterhouse, LTC, Robert G. McWard, LTC, Daniel H. Bolen, LTC, Ethics - Do Senior Officers Walk Where They Talk? Thesis. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 23 March 1987.

APPENDIX 6
RECOMMENDATIONS [1]
(Extracted from USAWC Professionalism Study)
1970

(1) Disseminate to the Officer Corps the pertinent findings of this study.

(2) Promote an atmosphere conducive to honest communication between junior and senior officers.

(3) Outline standards for counseling of subordinates.

(4) Motivate the competent and facilitate the elimination of the marginal performer.

(5) Enforce adherence to standards, with senior officers setting the example.

(6) Focus on the development of measurable expertise.

(7) Revise certain officer assignment priorities and policies, including policy regarding the duration and essentiality of command tours.

(8) Revise the evaluation system.

(9) Revise the concept of officer career patterns.

(10) Revise promotion policies.

1. York O. Joseph, LTC, Douglas D. Walterhouse, LTC, Robert G. McWard, LTC, Daniel H. Bolen, LTC, Ethics - Do Senior Officers Walk Where They Talk? Thesis. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 23 March 1987.

APPENDIX 7

STATISTICAL DATA

ANNEX A

COMMUNICATIONS

TAB 1 - TO ANNEX A

TARNISHED ARMOR COMMUNICATIONS OUTCOMES   PAGE 10, 15 FEB 1988

DATA COMPILATION
ETHICS - DO SENIOR OFFICERS WALK WHERE THEY TALK?

Q NO	CAT	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	4	99
Q10	C	10	2	9	4	4	6	30	18	52	2
Q11	C	7	2	10	4	9	7	35	25	38	0
Q14	C	5	4	12	11	6	10	36	13	40	0
Q15	C	7	2	11	10	2	9	34	19	42	1
Q16	C	5	2	5	5	6	10	23	25	51	5
Q25	C	7	3	5	5	10	15	32	14	46	0
Q36	C	12	5	30	12	11	10	24	10	22	1

TARNISHED ARMOR COMMUNICATIONS OUTCOMES   PAGE 11, 15 FEB 1988

TOT	NO	YES	INDIF	NO+I	DELTA	NO%	YES%	INDF%	DELTA%
137	21	100	14	35	65	16%	74%	10%	48%
137	19	98	20	39	59	14%	72%	15%	43%
137	21	89	27	48	41	15%	65%	20%	30%
137	20	95	21	41	54	15%	70%	15%	40%
137	12	99	21	33	66	9%	75%	16%	50%
137	15	92	30	45	47	11%	67%	22%	34%
137	47	56	33	80	-24	35%	41%	24%	-18%

TAB 2 - TO ANNEX A

COMMUNICATIONS QUESTIONS*

Question 10 - A command climate existed where the rater could be told that pressure was being felt to do something unethical.

Question 11 - Honesty and frankness were rewarded.

Question 14 - Discouraged unfavorable feedback from subordinates.

Question 15 - Was straight and honest in dealing with subordinates.

Question 16 - Counseled subordinates on a regular basis. i.e., "footlocker counseling."

Question 25 - Exerted pressure that contributed to unethical competitive behavior.

Question 36 - Mandatory OER support form was used to discuss ethical guidlines.

* York O. Joseph, LTC, Douglas D. Walterhouse, LTC, Robert G. McWard, LTC, Daniel H. Bolen, LTC, Ethics - Do Senior Officers Walk Where They Talk? Thesis. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 23 March 1987.

TAB 3 - TO ANNEX A

COMMUNICATION ATTRIBUTES

Question Numbers

TAB 4 - TO ANNEX A

COMMUNICATIONS CENTRAL TENDENCY

DATAFILE COMMO.DAT

	Sample 1 NEGATIVE	Sample 2 POSITIVE	Sample 3 INDIF	Sample 4 NEG+INDIF
1:	21	100	14	35
2:	19	98	20	39
3:	21	89	27	48
4:	20	95	21	41
5:	12	99	21	33
6:	15	92	30	45
7:	47	56	33	80
NO.	7	7	7	7
MEAN	22.14286	89.85714	23.71429	45.85715
MED	20.00000	95.00000	21.00000	41.00000
SDEV	11.46631	15.44267	6.575567	15.94186

ANNEX A - TAB 4.

ANNEX B

PERFORMANCE

TAB 1 - TO ANNEX B

TARNISHED ARMOR PERFORMANCE OUTCOMES   PAGE 12, 15 FEB 1988

DATA COMPILATION
ETHICS - DO SENIOR OFFICERS WALK WHERE THEY TALK?

Q NO	CAT	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	4	99
Q27	P	2	0	11	5	4	11	42	20	41	1
Q28	P	5	2	15	5	8	10	34	13	44	1
Q29	P	5	2	9	6	9	9	27	17	53	0
Q37	P	7	4	14	4	8	9	28	22	41	0
Q39	P	7	1	6	5	2	5	38	18	54	1

TARNISHED ARMOR PERFORMANCE OUTCOMES   PAGE 13, 15 FEB 1988

TOT	NO	YES	INDIF	NO+I	DELTA	NO%	YES%	INDF%	DELTA%
137	13	103	20	33	70	10%	76%	15%	51%
137	22	91	23	45	46	16%	67%	17%	34%
137	16	97	24	40	57	12%	71%	18%	42%
137	25	91	21	46	45	18%	66%	15%	33%
137	14	110	12	26	84	10%	81%	9%	62%

TAB 2 - TO ANNEX B

PERFORMANCE QUESTIONS[*]

Question 27 - Set the example for personal appearance.

Question 28 - Set the example for physical fitness.

Question 29 - Professed ethical standards were "lived out" in his everyday work and social behavior.

Question 37 - Served as an ethical role model.

Question 39 - Possessed the technical competence and leadership skills to perform his job.

[*] York O. Joseph, LTC, Douglas D. Walterhouse, LTC, Robert G. McWard, LTC, Daniel H. Bolen, LTC, Ethics - Do Senior Officers Walk Where They Talk? Thesis. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 23 March 1987.

TAB 3 - TO ANNEX B

PERFORMANCE ATTRIBUTES

Neg   Pos   Pos-short

Frequency

Question Numbers

TAB 4 - TO ANNEX B

PERFORMANCE CENTRAL TENDENCY

DATAFILE PERFORM.DAT

	Sample 1 NEGATIVE	Sample 2 POSITIVE	Sample 3 INDIF	Sample 4 NEG+INDIF
1:	13	103	20	33
2:	22	91	23	45
3:	16	97	24	40
4:	25	91	21	46
5:	14	110	12	26
NO.	5	5	5	5
MEAN	18.00000	98.40000	20.00000	38.00000
MED	16.00000	97.00000	21.00000	40.00000
SDEV	5.244045	8.173115	4.743417	8.455768

ANNEX B - TAB 4.

ANNEX C

LEADERSHIP

TAB 1 - TO ANNEX C

TARNISHED ARMOR LEADERSHIP OUTCOMES   PAGE 1,   4-Jan-80

DATA COMPILATION
ETHICS - DO SENIOR OFFICERS WALK WHERE THEY TALK?

Q NO	CAT	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	4	99
Q4	M	1	5	13	5	8	6	35	19	43	2
Q5	M	7	5	15	4	11	11	33	10	41	0
Q7	M	3	4	11	3	3	10	29	19	54	1
Q8	M	3	2	5	4	17	3	35	23	42	3
Q9	M	1	0	2	3	8	1	44	25	52	1
Q17	M	4	2	11	2	9	8	40	19	41	1
Q18	M	4	5	24	9	21	18	32	8	13	3
Q20	M	8	6	20	6	8	10	46	12	20	1
Q21	M	1	2	11	3	8	11	46	22	32	1
Q22	M	2	2	7	2	21	7	39	20	34	3
Q23	M	5	2	10	4	10	11	29	22	42	2
Q30	M	1	3	7	2	4	8	43	21	47	1
Q31	M	5	1	10	4	6	5	26	16	63	1
Q32	M	1	0	13	5	5	6	32	12	62	1
Q33	M	7	5	19	7	11	15	33	15	25	0
Q38	M	10	10	22	11	11	11	27	15	20	0
Q40	M	5	5	11	4	7	9	28	18	48	2
Q41	M	8	5	9	5	12	11	30	18	38	1

TOT	NO	(Y) YES	INDIF	(X) NO+I	DELTA		NO%	YES%	INDF%	DELTA%
137	19	97	19	38	59		14%	72%	14%	44%
137	27	84	26	53	31		20%	61%	19%	23%
137	18	102	16	34	68		13%	75%	12%	50%
137	10	100	24	34	66		7%	75%	18%	49%
137	3	121	12	15	106		2%	89%	9%	78%
137	17	100	19	36	64		13%	74%	14%	47%
137	33	53	48	81	-28		25%	40%	36%	-21%
137	34	78	24	58	20		25%	57%	18%	15%
137	14	100	22	36	64		10%	74%	16%	47%
137	11	93	30	41	52		8%	69%	22%	39%
137	17	93	25	42	51		13%	69%	19%	38%
137	11	111	14	25	86		8%	82%	10%	63%
137	16	105	15	31	74		12%	77%	11%	54%
137	14	106	16	30	76		10%	78%	12%	56%
137	31	73	33	64	9		23%	53%	24%	7%
137	42	62	33	75	-13		31%	45%	24%	-9%
137	21	94	20	41	53		16%	70%	15%	39%
137	22	86	28	50	36		16%	63%	21%	26%
		1658		784						

73

TAB 2 - TO ANNEX C

LEADERSHIP QUESTIONS[*]

Question 4 -   Rater required the same standards of conduct and behavior of all soldiers.

Question 5 -   Maintaining "good statistics" was a more important factor in receiving rewards than one's real contributions to the organization.

Question 7 -   Accepted responsibility for organizational failures.

Question 8 -   Was not biased towards females.

Question 9 -   Was not biased toward minorities.

Question 17 - Rewarded selfless service.

Question 18 - Penalized those whose actions were self-serving.

Question 20 - Would accept any mission or task from higher headquarters regardless of the ability of the organization to perform it

Question 21 - Took corrective action against substandard performance.

Question 22 - Would rather miss reenlistment objectives than reenlist substandard soldiers.

Question 23 - Would stand up to his superiors on behalf of his subordinates.

Question 30 - Demanded and enforced high standards of discipline within the organization.

Question 31 - Social behavior was above reproach.

Question 32 - Demonstrated confidence and trust in subordinates.

Question 33 - Was intolerant of subordinates' failures or mistakes.

Question 38 - Conducted training on values.

Question 40 - Career goals did not take precedence over organizational goals.

Question 41 - Staying ahead of his peers was less important than actual organizational effectiveness.

* York O. Joseph, LTC, Douglas D. Walterhouse, LTC, Robert G. McWard, LTC, Daniel H. Bolen, LTC, Ethics - Do Senior Officers Walk Where They Talk? Thesis. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 23 March 1987.

TAB 3 - TO ANNEX C

Question Numbers

TAB 4 - TO ANNEX C

LEADERSHIP CENTRAL TENDENCY

DATAFILE LDRSHP.DAT

	Sample 1 NEGATIVE	Sample 2 POSITIVE	Sample 3 INDIF	Sample 4 NEG+INDIF
1:	19	97	19	38
2:	27	84	26	53
3:	18	102	16	34
4:	10	100	24	34
5:	3	121	12	15
6:	17	100	19	36
7:	33	53	48	81
8:	34	78	24	58
9:	14	100	22	36
10:	11	93	30	41
11:	17	93	25	42
12:	11	111	14	25
13:	16	105	15	31
14:	14	106	16	30
15:	31	73	33	64
16:	42	62	33	75
17:	21	94	20	41
18:	22	86	28	50
NO.	18	18	18	18
MEAN	20.00000	92.11111	23.55556	43.55556
MED	17.50000	95.50000	23.00000	39.50000
SDEV	9.958738	17.09452	8.793194	17.13690

ANNEX C - TAB 4

ANNEX D

ETHICS

TARNISHED ARMOR ETHICAL OUTCOMES   PAGE 7, 15 FEB 1988

DATA COMPILATION
ETHICS - DO SENIOR OFFICERS WALK WHERE THEY TALK?

Q NO	CAT	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	4	99
Q1	E	9	0	23	5	3	8	23	19	45	2
Q2	E	5	2	5	5	6	10	23	25	51	5
Q3	E	2	5	4	3	8	5	31	12	66	1
Q6	E	5	0	4	5	7	7	35	16	57	1
Q12	E	3	6	12	8	10	6	30	19	42	1
Q13	E	4	3	16	3	9	10	37	18	37	0
Q19	E	5	1	9	6	11	9	35	19	41	1
Q24	E	3	4	7	3	9	16	38	19	38	0
Q26	E	8	3	11	4	10	9	36	11	44	1
Q34	E	8	1	21	7	25	10	34	10	21	0
Q35	E	3	1	10	6	15	12	35	14	41	0
Q42	E	5	4	9	2	8	9	35	19	42	4
Q43	E	4	5	13	5	3	10	32	17	43	0

TARNISHED ARMOR ETHICAL OUTCOMES   PAGE 8, 15 FEB 1988

TOT	NO	YES	INDIF	NO+I	DELTA	NO%	YES%	INDF%	DELTA%
137	32	87	16	48	39	24%	64%	12%	29%
137	12	99	21	33	66	9%	75%	16%	50%
137	11	109	16	27	82	8%	80%	12%	60%
137	9	108	19	28	80	7%	79%	14%	59%
137	21	91	24	45	46	15%	67%	18%	34%
137	23	92	22	45	47	17%	67%	16%	34%
137	15	95	26	41	54	11%	70%	19%	40%
137	14	95	28	42	53	10%	69%	20%	39%
137	22	91	23	45	46	16%	67%	17%	34%
137	30	65	42	72	-7	22%	47%	31%	-5%
137	14	90	33	47	43	10%	66%	24%	31%
137	18	96	19	37	59	14%	72%	14%	44%
137	22	97	18	40	57	16%	71%	13%	42%

TAB 2 - TO ANNEX D

ETHICAL QUESTIONS*

Question 1 - When it came to ethical standards, there were no grey areas.

Question 2 - Did not allow the demands for meeting goals to foster unethical behavior.

Question 3 - Unethical behavior to accomplish the mission was rewarded.

Question 6 - Always provided higher headquarters with honest reports.

Question 12 - Subordinates who displayed strong ethical convictions were viewed as not being team players.

Question 13 - Avoided discussing ethical issues.

Question 19 - Distortion in reporting was not tolerated.

Question 24 - Covered up incidents which might cause him or the organization to look bad.

Question 26 - Would take credit for work or accomplishments that rightfully belonged to others.

Question 34 - Cited examples of correct ethical behavior by others.

Question 35 - Clearly emphasized that demanding requirements do not justify "bending" our ethical norms.

ETHICAL QUESTIONS
(Continued)

Question 42 -   I do not lie, cheat, or steal or tolerate people who do truthfully characterizes my last rater.

Question 43 -   "Do as I say, not as I do," describes my rater.

* York O. Joseph, LTC, Douglas D. Walterhouse, LTC, Robert G. McWard, LTC, Daniel H. Bolen, LTC, Ethics - Do Senior Officers Walk Where They Talk? Thesis. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 23 March 1987.

TAB 3 - TO ANNEX D

ETHICAL STATEMENTS

Question Numbers

TAB 4 - TO ANNEX D

ETHICS CENTRAL TENDENCY

DATAFILE ETHICS.DAT

	Sample 1 NEGATIVE	Sample 2 POSITIVE	Sample 3 INDIF	Sample 4 NEG+INDIF
1:	32	87	16	48
2:	12	99	21	33
3:	11	109	16	27
4:	9	108	19	28
5:	21	91	24	45
6:	23	92	22	45
7:	15	95	26	41
8:	14	95	28	42
9:	22	91	23	45
10:	30	65	42	72
11:	14	90	33	47
12:	18	96	19	37
13:	22	97	18	40
NO.	13	13	13	13
MEAN	18.69231	93.46154	23.61539	42.30770
MED	18.00000	95.00000	22.00000	42.00000
SDEV	7.110843	10.74412	7.365896	11.25007

ANNEX D - TAB 4